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Executive Summary
In its 2018 budget, the Government of Canada
pledged CDN$85.3 million over five years to support
an ambitious new intellectual property (IP) strategy,
including CDN$30 million for the formation
of a Canadian “patent collective.” This paper
explores the possible structure and goals of such a
collective, as well as potential risks and challenges
of each. It concludes that appreciable technology
development by Canadian firms is not likely to be
achieved through the proposed patent collective.
The paper recommends that the proposed
Canadian patent collective avoid the acquisition
and aggregation of patents and instead focus its
limited resources on three supportive functions
for Canadian industry: assisting Canadian firms,
through subsidies or other resource commitments,
to participate in existing international defensive
patent networks; encouraging Canadian
universities and research institutions to focus on
commercially relevant “translational” research;
and assessing the potential benefits of facilitating
patent sharing or pooling arrangements in select
Canadian industries, and offering administrative
and infrastructural support for such efforts.

collective.2 This proposal appears to respond to
recent suggestions that Canada consider the
establishment of a “sovereign patent fund” (SPF),
emulating models developed in Japan, South
Korea, China, Taiwan and France.3 However, the
structure and goals of these state-operated entities
vary dramatically,4 ranging from offensive patent
acquisition, assertion and litigation, to industrial
promotion and support within national borders. It
is not clear which of these paths Canada intends to
tread. While the budget promises that the minister
of innovation, science and economic development
will “bring forward the full details of the
strategy in the coming months,”5 the parameters
of such a patent collective are still scant.
The 2018 budget defines a patent collective as
“a way for firms to share, generate, and license
or purchase intellectual property. The collective
approach is intended to help Canadian firms
ensure a global ‘freedom to operate’, mitigate
the risk of infringing a patent, and aid in the
defence of a patent infringement suit.” It further
explains that the collective “will work with
Canada’s entrepreneurs to pool patents, so that

2

Ibid. In addition to the patent collective, the 2018 budget allocates
CDN$4.5 million to “the creation of an intellectual property
marketplace...a one-stop, online listing of public sector-owned intellectual
property available for licensing or sale.” While not the principal subject
of this paper, it is worth questioning the wisdom of this proposed
expenditure. Numerous online patent marketplaces already exist (see e.g.
IAM Market, online: <www.iam-market.com>; ideaconnection, online:
<www.ideaconnection.com/patents/>; IP Marketplace, online: <www.
ip-marketplace.org/search?type=patent>) and not one has achieved
overwhelming success. In fact, some of the more prominent efforts in
this area have failed after the expenditure of large sums. See e.g. Jorge
L Contreras, “FRAND Market Failure: IPXI’s Standards-Essential Patent
License Exchange” (2016) 15 Chicago-Kent J Intell Prop 419. Rather than
spend millions on yet another bespoke online patent marketplace, the
Canadian government may wish to consider listing relevant Canadian
patents with one or more existing patent marketplaces at a substantially
lower cost.

3

See e.g. Warren Clarke, “A Worthwhile Intervention? The Potential
Role for a Sovereign Patent Fund in Canada” CIGI, New Thinking on
Innovation Essay Series, 25 April 2017; Warren Clarke & James W
Hinton, Mobilizing National Innovation Assets: Understanding the
Role of Sovereign Patent Funds (Waterloo, ON: Centre for Digital
Entrepreneurship + Economic Performance, 2016); Pierre-Emmanuel
Moyse, “Towards Increased Innovation: Exploring the Effectiveness of
Sovereign Patent Funds in Canada” (McGill Faculty of Law, Research
Seminar 1: Intellectual Property Policy in the Making, CMPL 508,
7 December 2015); Pierre-Emmanuel Moyse & M Jean-Arpad Français,
“Sovereign Patent Funds: Is there a Canadian Option?” (McGill Faculty
of Law, Intellectual Property Policy in the Making, CMPL 508,
7 December 2015).

4

See Clarke, supra note 3; Oonagh Fitzgerald, “Understanding the
Promise and Peril of Sovereign Patent Funds” CIGI, Policy Brief No 102,
13 April 2017.

5

Budget 2018, supra note 1 at 116.

Introduction
In its 2018 budget, the Government of Canada
pledged CDN$85.3 million over five years to
support an ambitious new intellectual property
strategy “to help Canadians better understand
and protect intellectual property, and get better
access to shared intellectual property.”1 Among
the specific initiatives mentioned in the budget
is CDN$30 million for the formation of a patent

1

Government of Canada, Budget 2018: Equality and Growth – A Strong
Middle Class (2018) at 116 [Budget 2018], online: <www.budget.
gc.ca/2018/home-accueil-en.html>.
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small and medium-sized firms have better access
to the critical intellectual property they need
to grow their businesses.”6 Unfortunately, these
“definitions” are not definitions at all. Rather,
they are broad policy goals for the proposed
collective. This paper explores some possible
structures for advancing these policy goals, as
well as potential risks and challenges of each. This
paper then asks what mechanisms the collective
might adopt and how it might best be designed
to help Canadian industry and entrepreneurs.

Twin Purposes for the
Collective?
The budget advances two distinct but intertwined
purposes for the proposed patent collective.
First, there is a developmental purpose: to enable
Canadian firms to “share” and “generate” IP,
and to enable Canadian small and mediumsized enterprises (SMEs) to have better access
to IP so that they can grow their businesses,
presumably through technology development.
The developmental thrust of the collective
seems to imply that Canadian firms, especially
SMEs, need help developing more and better
IP, and that access to more patents will help
them do so. Hence, the collective will seek to
make more IP available to Canadian firms to
enhance their own IP development efforts.
Second, the collective has a defensive purpose: to
give Canadian firms freedom to operate, mitigate
the risk of patent infringement and aid in the
defence of infringement suits. Here, the assumption
seems to be that giving Canadian firms access
to more patents will both prevent their own
infringement of those patents and enable them to
use those patents in counterclaims against parties
that might sue them (for example, defensively).
In assessing how a patent collective could be
structured to achieve these twin goals, a few
questions need to be asked: whose patents will
be included in the collective, what technologies
will be covered by these patents, what rights will
be held by the collective and what rights will be

6

2

Ibid.
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granted to Canadian firms? Below, the author
addresses each of these questions in the context of
the twin goals of the proposed patent collective.

Developmental Use
One of the principal goals of the Canadian patent
collective is to enhance the technology and IP
development capabilities of Canadian firms. How
would a patent collective do this? There are several
possible approaches that can be considered.

Direct Commercial Usage
The most intuitive way to structure a patent
collective for developmental use would be for
the collective to acquire rights under patents
covering technologies useful to Canadian firms
and then license those rights to the firms that can
make use of them. For example, if a Norwegian
firm owns a patented method for conducting
seismological surveys, the collective could obtain
a licence to that technology on behalf of Canadian
firms that could then use it to improve their own
oil and gas exploration operations. In addition,
Canadian oilfield equipment manufacturers
could incorporate that method into their own
products, thereby improving them and increasing
sales both within Canada and globally. This
approach can be called “direct commercial usage”
of patent rights acquired by the collective.
While direct commercial usage is, at first glance,
attractive, there are several reasons that it is
not likely to be a practical way forward for the
Canadian patent collective. First, direct commercial
usage will require the collective to identify and
choose patents to benefit specific Canadian
industries. With an initial budget of only
CDN$30 million, the number of industries will
necessarily be small, at least in the beginning,
thus giving the collective a preferential
character that falls short of the Canadawide aspirations laid out in the budget.7

7

Such a selective approach would be closer to the industrial policy
approaches of Asian economies such as Japan, Taiwan and China, in
which governmental agencies select key industrial sectors (for example,
electronics, automotive, solar panels or semiconductors) for support and
promotion.

Second, it will not be easy to find suitable patents
for direct commercial usage. To the extent that
foreign firms possess patents that have commercial
application to the operations or products of
Canadian firms, the patent-holding firms may
prefer to sell their own products or services
embodying the patented technology to Canadian
firms, rather than enable Canadian firms to do so
independently. If patent-holding firms are open to
licensing their patents (rather than selling products
or services to Canadian firms), then the licensing
rates are likely to be based on commercial usage
by Canadian firms. For example, in the seismology
example, above, if a Canadian oilfield services
company uses the patented method to generate
service revenue, then the patent holder would likely
charge a royalty based on that revenue. Would the
collective commit to paying ongoing royalties based
on revenue of particular Canadian companies?
Doing so would be nothing more than an industrial
subsidy, which, if the Canadian government
wished to offer it, could be accomplished more
directly through governmental loans, grants or tax
incentives. Of course, ongoing royalty payments
could be avoided if the patent collective purchased
the relevant patents outright (rather than licensing
them from the owners), but it seems unlikely that a
foreign firm would be willing to part with valuable
patents that have direct commercial application
or, if it did, the price would be high (a challenge,
given the patent collective’s modest budget).
In sum, if commercially valuable patents are
available for licensing, it is likely that Canadian
firms already have the opportunity to license
those patents on an individual negotiated
basis. Intervention by the proposed patent
collective might offer nothing more than a
monetary subsidy to a limited segment of
Canadian industry, a result that could probably
be achieved through more direct means.

Facilitating Research
and Development
A Canadian collective could also focus on the
acquisition of patent rights to enable Canadian
firms to conduct research and development
(R&D) prior to the launch of commercial
products and services. There is some evidence
that the existence of patent rights may
dampen R&D activity in particular fields, so
the collective could serve a useful function
by removing barriers to Canadian R&D.

This approach is attractive for several reasons.
First, it is likely that obtaining research rights
under existing patents would be less expensive
than obtaining rights for commercial exploitation.
Second, R&D conducted in Canada would primarily
implicate Canadian patents, as opposed to patents
across the globe (as the sale of commercial products
would). Again, this suggests that obtaining a
Canadian R&D licence would be more affordable
for the collective than obtaining commercial
exploitation rights. This being said, it is not clear
that the acquisition of Canadian R&D rights
from the holders of Canadian patents would
add much value to the existing R&D enterprise.
Unlike the United States, Canada’s patent law
recognizes a strong “research exemption” that
permits experimentation and development using
patented technologies.8 Thus, acquiring these
rights in Canada may not add much beyond
what is already permitted under Canadian law.

Technology Transfer
Another oft-repeated benefit of patent collective
arrangements is their potential to facilitate the
beneficial transfer of technology to a target
country. In theory, this transfer can occur
through technical education and training,
capacity building and increased availability of
technology tools within the country. This rationale,
however, has the most salience in the context
of developing countries that lack advanced
technology resources. It is not particularly
compelling for an advanced nation such as Canada,
which already has a sophisticated technology
infrastructure, a pre-eminent educational system
and an abundance of technology firms. It is,
thus, unlikely that technology transfer, as it is
generally understood, would be a meaningful
outcome of the proposed patent collective.

Patent Sharing
In addition to seeking to promote Canadian
firms’ generation of IP, the 2018 budget states
that the proposed patent collective should
also promote the “sharing” of IP by Canadian
firms. This goal is somewhat different than
those discussed above. It suggests a structure
whereby Canadian firms might combine their

8

See e.g. Merck & Co v Apotex Inc, 2006 FC 524; Micro Chemicals
Limited et al v Smith Kline & French Inter-American Corporation, [1972]
SCR 506, 1971 CanLII 180 (SCC).
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own patent holdings for mutual benefit, rather
than one in which foreign patents are amassed.
The idea of a Canadian patent-sharing network is
intriguing. One model for such a structure may be
Canada’s Oil Sands Innovation Alliance (COSIA),
which was formed in 2012 to offer a platform
for Canadian firms to share information and
technology relating to oil sands exploitation.9 As
of this writing, COSIA reports that its 10 member
companies have shared 936 distinct technologies,10
although the parameters of that sharing are not
disclosed. The author suspects that the sharing
effected through COSIA involves some preliminary
information exchange regarding technologies of
interest, rather than the formal conveyance of
rights in commercially valuable technologies. If
so, the principal value added by the collaborative
would simply be making available an organized
forum for industry participants to convene and
discuss future business collaboration: valuable but
probably not transformative, and of the greatest
benefit in industries already having a critical mass
of Canadian participants (for example, resource
extraction and petrochemicals, rather than
outward-bound technology product markets).
Even so, there is something to be said for
facilitating interaction, cooperation and technology
sharing among market participants. If Canada does
decide to create a platform for these activities,
it would be well-advised to incorporate metrics
by which the utilization and performance of
such a platform can be measured. For example,
how often the platform is utilized and by what
types of entities, how much technology is
shared and what are the tangible results of the
cooperation? Research has shown that patentsharing platforms that lack meaningful indicators
of success can fail when they cannot demonstrate
their value to the market or their participants.11
An even greater degree of technology sharing
could be achieved through patent pools, in which

9

See COSIA, “About COSIA”, online, <www.cosia.ca/about-cosia>;
Bassem Awad, “Global Patent Pledges: A Collaborative Mechanism for
Climate Change Technology” CIGI, CIGI Papers No 81, 27 November
2015 at 7.

10 COSIA, supra note 9.
11 See Jorge L Contreras, Bronwyn H Hall & Christian Helmers, Assessing
the Effectiveness of the Eco-Patent Commons: A Post-mortem Analysis,
CIGI, CIGI Papers No 161, 20 February 2018 at 17, online: <www.
cigionline.org/publications/assessing-effectiveness-eco-patent-commonspost-mortem-analysis>.

4
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competitors combine their patent holdings in order
to eliminate blocking positions and more efficiently
license their collective rights to the industry.12 To
avoid antitrust and competition law concerns,
patent pools are generally structured narrowly
to include only complementary technologies
and to exclude technologies that may act as
substitutes for each other. Thus, at least under
current legal requirements, industry-wide (not to
mention economy-wide) patent pools are rare.
This being said, a Canadian patent collective
would not need to operate a trans-industrial
patent pool. Rather, such an organization could
facilitate the formation of patent pools within
specific Canadian industries and then act as an
impartial administrator of such pools, much as
the MPEG LA and Via Licensing organizations
do.13 However, this approach begs the question
whether there are enough Canadian patent
holders in any given industry to form a pool that
will have realistic prospects for licensing or that
will materially benefit firms wishing to enter the
industry. For example, if the Canadian patent
collective assembles patents from three Canadian
geophysical firms, is this enough to enable a new
SME to enter the field, or will the SME still require
technology and rights from other (non-Canadian)
firms that do not participate in the collective?
Another question is whether Canadian firms will
themselves be inclined to cooperate with their
closest geographical competitors in this manner,
when they have not previously been motivated
to do so. The likely answers to these questions
suggest that, while a Canadian patent collective
may offer some benefits to Canadian firms by
facilitating the formation and management of
patent pools, this approach is unlikely to result in
significant competitive gains for Canadian firms
across the board. Nevertheless, given the relatively
modest cost of such facilitation and its potential
to help at least a few Canadian industries, this
activity may be worth exploring in more detail.

12 See Richard J Gilbert, “Collective Rights Organizations: A Guide to
Benefits, Costs and Antitrust Safeguards” in Jorge L Contreras, ed,
Cambridge Handbook of Technical Standardization Law: Competition,
Antitrust, and Patents (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press,
2017) ch 8.
13 MPEG LA is a firm based in Denver, Colorado, that acts as the licensing
agent for several patent pools, covering audio-video compression
and other standardized technology formats, including the popular
MP3 and MP4 file formats. See MPEG LA, online: <www.mpegla.
com>. Via Licensing acts as the licensing agent for Wi-Fi, 3G and other
communications and computing standards. See Via Licensing, online:
<www.via-corp.com/us/en/index.html>.

Are Universities the Answer?
It has been suggested that Canadian universities
may be a viable source of patents for
commercialization through a vehicle such as the
patent collective.14 Canadian universities and
teaching hospitals spend more than CDN$12
billion annually in R&D, ranking Canada eighth
out of 16 peer countries in terms of public R&D
investment.15 But despite these impressive outlays,
commercializing university technology is difficult
and fraught with uncertainty, not only in Canada
but around the world. According to one recent
report, only 11 percent of the 220 US university
technology licensing offices turn a profit, and even
technology juggernauts such as Stanford University
strike gold only rarely (of 10,000 invention
disclosures made at Stanford between 1970 and
2015, only 77 generated more than US$1 million
in revenue, and only three generated more than
US$100 million).16 There are several explanations
for these low figures, including the relatively early
stage of most university research, the uncertainty of
its commercial potential and the lack of industrial
champions behind it. While there is undoubtedly
valuable commercial technology residing within
Canada’s pre-eminent research institutions, it is
unclear how the proposed patent collective would
unlock the potential of that technology in a manner
that is more effective than the technology licensing
efforts that already exist at these institutions.
Would an omnibus governmental agency be better
at getting Canadian academic discoveries into
the stream of commerce than the universities
that developed the technology? It is hard to see
how this could be the case. For Canadian (and
other) firms that wish to commercialize the
technology developed by Canadian research
institutions, clear pathways for doing so already
exist at no additional cost to the government.

“translational science” research.17 If socially
useful and commercially attractive technology
emerges from Canadian research institutions,
then its odds of being adopted in commerce could
be reasonable. Thus, a focus on encouraging the
development of innovative new technologies
in the academic sector seems preferable to the
expenditure of funds on the acquisition of Canadian
academic patents that have not previously
attracted the attention of commercial actors.

Defensive Use
Patent litigation, particularly the need to defend
against patent suits brought by financially
motivated patent assertion entities (PAEs), has
been identified as a significant business risk in key
technology-focused industries.18 Thus, in addition to
the developmental goals of the proposed Canadian
patent collective, the 2018 budget describes a series
of defensive features that the collective may offer
Canadian firms: freedom to operate, infringement
risk mitigation and assistance in defending against
infringement claims.19 These goals aim to address
two related risks faced by firms in Canada: their
operations in Canada may infringe Canadian
patents held by foreign third parties, and the
products and services that they offer outside
Canada may infringe third-party patents in the
countries of sale or use. By acquiring patents
that might otherwise be asserted, or the right to
operate under them, the collective could, in theory,
immunize Canadian firms from some of these risks.
Today, there are two basic structures in place for
the collective defensive use of patents: defensive
aggregation and voluntary pledge communities.

If Canada wishes to support the flow of technology
from Canadian universities to the private
sector, then it may instead wish to explore the
funding of more practical and industry-focused

14 Karima Bawa, “After Failing to Commercialize, Universities Learn to Set
Ideas Free” CIGI, New Thinking on Innovation Essay Series, 25 April
2017 at 73, 76.
15 Conference Board of Canada, “Patents”, online: <www.conferenceboard.
ca/hcp/provincial/innovation/patents.aspx>.
16 Dave Merrill, Blacki Migliozzi & Susan Decker, “Billions at Stake in
University Patent Fights”, Bloomberg (24 May 2016), online: <http://
jyelaw.com/wp-content/uploads/2017/03/UniveristyPatents.pdf>.

17 For example, in 2011, the US National Institutes of Health formed
the National Center for the Advancement of Translational Sciences
(NCATS), an institute-level centre devoted to conducting and funding
translational research in the biomedical sciences with an initial budget
of approximately US$600 million. See NCATS, “Past Budgets”, online:
<https://ncats.nih.gov/about/center/budget/past>. The author served as
one of the inaugural advisory committee members of NCATS.
18 See e.g. European Commisison, JRC Science for Policy Report: Patent
Assertion Entities in Europe (Luxembourg: Publications Office of the
European Union, 2016); Executive Office of the President, Patent
Assertion and U.S. Innovation (2013).
19 Budget 2018, supra note 1 at 116.
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Defensive Aggregation
One collective strategy for the defensive use of
patents involves the aggregation of numerous
patents into a single member-based entity, which
then provides its members the right to operate
under those patents. This is the model adopted
by RPX Corporation, established in 2008,20 and
Allied Security Trust (AST), established in 2007.21
Although their business models differ (RPX is a
for-profit, publicly traded company; AST is a nonprofit cooperative), both of these entities approach
patent aggregation in a similar manner.22 RPX
explains that “we remove patents — pre-litigation
and out of active litigation — before they can
become a costly problem for our clients.”23 The
company claims that it has acquired more than
23,000 patents and associated rights since its
inception and has more than 330 members.24 AST
claims that it has provided its 30 global members
with a measure of safety under approximately
2,500 patents and associated rights, which are
offered in industry-specific categories (for example,
mobile, media and internet, advertising and so
forth).25 Both RPX and AST charge their members
annual fees: RPX’s have been reported (as of 2014)
to range from US$85,000 to $7 million,26 and AST’s
range from US$25,000 to $200,00027 (both based on
members’ annual revenue). RPX reports that it has
spent more than US$1.1 billion on the acquisition
of patent rights through the end of 2017.28
There is a strong argument to be made for the
defensive benefits of targeted patent aggregation.
Canadian firms could certainly benefit from licences
to patents that might otherwise be asserted

20 RPX Corporation, “The RPX Network”, online: <www.rpxcorp.com/rpxnetwork/>.
21 AST, “About Us”, online: <www.ast.com/about-us/asts-mission/>.
22 See generally Andrei Hagiu & David B Yoffie, The New Patent
Intermediaries: Platforms, Defensive Aggregators, and SuperAggregators, (2013) 27:1 J Econ Perspectives 45 at 56–58.
23 RPX Corporation, supra note 20.
24 Ibid.
25 See Malathi Nayak, “Google, Ford, Others Complete Defensive Patent
Group Buy”, Bloomberg Law (6 February 2018), online: <www.ast.com/
news_article/google-ford-others-complete-defensive-patent-group-buy/>.
26 Ryan Davis, “Buying Patents to Thwart ‘Trolls’ is a Tricky Strategy”,
Law360 (3 November 2014).
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against them in litigation. It is questionable,
however, whether it is necessary for Canada to
embark on the creation of a new defensive patent
aggregation vehicle when groups such as RPX and
AST each have a decade or more of experience
in this complex business. Moreover, with a “war
chest” of only CDN$30 million, such an aggregator
would only be able to acquire a small set of rights
compared to an entity such as RPX. It is possible
that a Canadian defensive aggregator could
focus primarily on acquiring Canadian patent
rights, which would presumably be available
at a lower price than the global rights generally
acquired by RPX and AST. But, as noted above,
Canadian patents are less than half of the story for
Canadian firms that seek to offer their products
and services outside Canada. These firms require
freedom to operate across all major markets, not
only in Canada. Finally, it is not even clear that
established defensive aggregators such as RPX will
continue to enjoy financial success, given patent
litigation trends in the United States and elsewhere,
making the establishment of a new aggregator
particularly risky from a financial standpoint.29
For all of these reasons, the creation of a new
Canadian-focused defensive patent aggregator
at this time seems inadvisable. Instead, the
Canadian government may wish to consider
allocating some of the funds earmarked for
its patent collective to enable Canadian firms,
SMEs in particular, to join existing defensive
aggregators such as RPX and AST. If the Canadian
government helped to offset Canadian firms’
membership fees in these existing organizations,
it would enable them to benefit from substantial
defensive portfolios that are already available,
rather than venturing into difficult and risky
waters with a new Canadian aggregation effort.

Defensive Pledge Communities
In addition to the entity-based patent aggregators
discussed above, a number of less formal contractbased defensive patent networks have arisen over
the past few years. These rely on collective promises
or “pledges” made by like-minded firms in a more
or less coordinated manner.30 The most notable
of these are the Defensive Patent License (DPL)

27 AST, “The AST Membership Advantage”, online: <www.ast.com/aboutus/be-a-member/>.

29 See e.g. Dan Caplinger, “Falling Income, Revenue Plague RPX”, Motley
Fool (31 October 2017), online: <www.fool.com/investing/2017/10/31/
falling-income-revenue-plague-rpx.aspx>.

28 RPX Corporation, Annual Report on Form 10-K for the Fiscal Year ended
December 31, 2017 at 7.

30 See generally Jorge L Contreras, “Patent Pledges” (2015) 47:3 Ariz St LJ
543 at 567–68.
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and Google’s License on Transfer (LOT) Network,
both of which were launched in 2014 and focus on
the software and high-tech sectors. Each of these
networks seeks to discourage participants from
transferring patents to PAEs. Under the DPL, a
participant pledges not to assert its patents against
any other DPL participant except defensively (for
example, in response to a patent infringement suit
by the other party). Under the LOT agreement,
each participant agrees that if it transfers a patent
to a PAE, then every other participant will receive
a royalty-free licence to that patent. Joining the
DPL is free; joining the LOT Network requires a
modest fee of US$1,500 to $20,000. For a variety
of structural reasons, the DPL has not gained
significant momentum, whereas the LOT Network,
as of November 2017, claimed approximately
180 members and 180,000 pledged patents.31
Defensive patent pledge communities are lowcost mechanisms for coordinating responses to
common problems such as the proliferation of PAE
litigation. The DPL and LOT mechanisms described
above are open to firms around the world. While
the government’s desire to provide Canadian
firms with protection against unwarranted patent
litigation is admirable, it is not clear that additional
pledge mechanisms are necessary beyond those
already in place through programs such as the DPL
and LOT. A new Canada-specific network could
potentially address industry sectors that are not
currently addressed by these existing networks,
yet the industries represented by these networks
are clearly those most affected by excess patent
litigation. Thus, unless there is evidence that
Canadian industry, outside of high technology,
suffers from an excess of patent lawsuits,
investing significant resources in the duplication
of existing pledge structures would seem to
be a poor use of funds that is not likely to offer
meaningful additional benefits to Canadian firms.

firms in defending against patent infringement
litigation, either within or outside Canada. As such,
the program could operate like liability insurance:
assuming the cost of defending (and settling)
claims within the scope of coverage (in this case,
patent infringement). Establishing such a program
may have intuitive appeal: by stepping in to help
Canadian SMEs defend against frivolous patent
suits, it could neutralize the harmful effects of PAE
litigation on Canadian industry and innovation.
Despite its initial appeal, however, such a program
has significant — and probably fatal — problems.
First, it would be difficult to assess which patent
suits such a program should defend. Would it
apply only to suits brought by PAEs? Would some
suits by practising/competitive entities also be
covered? If so, how would these two categories of
patent holders be differentiated? Second, as is welldocumented in the insurance literature, the ready
availability of insurance creates a moral hazard: the
insured will act in a riskier manner if they know
they will not be directly responsible for the costs
of their actions. Would the availability of patent
infringement “insurance” encourage Canadian
firms to infringe more patents, perhaps in lieu of
entering into legitimate licence agreements? And
if the fund covers not only litigation costs, but
damages and settlement amounts as well, then the
fund would simply be making a pricey commercial
subsidy to infringing firms. Third, if an insurance
fund covered settlement amounts in addition to
litigation costs, the very existence of the fund
could make Canadian firms more likely targets
of infringement claims. That is, a PAE seeking
quick, but sizeable, infringement settlements
could be incentivized to target Canadian SMEs
as sources of settlement funds (unlike SMEs in
other countries, which might lack the funds to
pay out significant settlement amounts).32

Patent Defence Costs
A final defensive patent mechanism does not
involve the aggregation of patents or patent
rights at all but is purely financial in nature. It is a
defensive cost indemnity arrangement: a program
whereby the Canadian government could set aside
funds to defray the costs incurred by Canadian

31 LOT Network, “The LOT Network Community”, online: <http://lotnet.
com/our-community/#member-list>. For a recent comparison of the DPL
and LOT structures and features, see Jorge L Contreras, “The Evolving
Patent Pledge Landscape” CIGI, CIGI Papers No 166, 3 April 2018.

32 The emergence of medical malpractice insurance in the United States
gave rise to similar trends. While it would generally not be profitable to
sue independent medical practitioners, suing well-insured hospitals and
medical groups became a cottage industry in many US states, resulting
in a medical malpractice “crisis” in the 1980s. See e.g. David L Nye et
al, “The Causes of the Medical Malpractice Crisis: An Analysis of Claims
Data and Insurance Company Finances” (1988) 76 Georgetown LJ 1495.
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Offensive Use
Unstated in the budget is a third potential use for
the proposed Canadian patent collective: patent
enforcement as a revenue generation tool. This
approach has been taken by some of the foreign
SPFs on which Canada’s collective might be
based. Japan’s IP Bridge and France Brevets, for
example, acquired portfolios of patents and now
enforce them around the world. These SPFs raise
revenue (“monetize” their patents) both through
licensing and litigation.33 Such entities have been
criticized as “state-funded patent trolls.”34
Is this a direction in which Canada wishes to
go? Some commentators have suggested that
Canada should consider such an SPF approach,35
but if it does, Canada should re-evaluate the
amount of its commitment to this enterprise.
According to Warren Clarke, most SPFs have been
capitalized at levels ranging from CDN$100 to
$500 million,36 significantly above the CDN$30
million committed to the Canadian patent
collective. Patent litigation is expensive,37 as are
acquisition costs of patents (to enforce a patent,
ownership is generally required, which is more
costly than a licence). Thus, it is not clear that,
even if it so desired, the proposed CDN$30 million
Canadian patent collective could operate as
an effective PAE.38 But practicalities aside, as a
33 See e.g. Clarke & Hinton, supra note 3 at 15–18.
34 Hosuk Lee-Makiyama & Patrick Messerlin, “Sovereign Patent Funds
(SPFs): Next-generation Trade Defence?” (2014) European Centre for
International Political Economy Policy Brief No 6/2014 at 1; Moyse,
supra note 3 at 12–13.
35 See Clarke, supra note 3; Fitzgerald, supra note 4; Moyse, supra note 3.
36 Clarke, supra note 3; Fitzgerald, supra note 4 at 2.
37 Federal Trade Commission, Patent Assertion Entity Activity: An FTC Study
(2016).
38 One commentator favouring the formation of a Canadian SPF points to
patents generated by the bankrupt Canadian firm Nortel Networks that
were acquired by a consortium of foreign firms that are now profiting
from them, arguing that “[t]hese patents were created by a Canadian
enterprise and are now generating profits for foreign enterprises.
It is imperative that Canada starts investing to retain its patents and
the profits they are capable of generating.” See Moyse, supra note
3 at 33. However, what Moyse fails to mention is that the Rockstar
consortium (Apple, RIM, Ericsson, Microsoft and Sony) acquired Nortel’s
patents for US$4.5 billion, a far cry from the CDN$30 million that the
government has allocated to the proposed patent collective. It is also
worth remembering that Canadian firm RIM (now Blackberry) was part
of the acquiring group. And Blackberry itself has recently come under
fire for adopting many of the characteristics of a PAE. See e.g. Devin
Barrie, “Has Blackberry become a ‘patent troll’? Not quite, says Ottawa
researcher”, Ottawa Citizen (13 April 2018).
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policy matter, it would be a mistake for Canada
to facilitate the creation of yet another PAE in a
world that is already rife with unproductive patent
litigation. In addition to the general unpleasantness
of such an approach, creating a Canadian
national PAE could have significant negative
repercussions among Canada’s trading partners39
and multinationals operating within Canada.

Consumer Access
Notably, the 2018 budget does not indicate
that the proposed patent collective is intended
to facilitate consumer access to patented
technologies such as essential medications.
It appears, rather, to be directed principally
to commercial ends and to improving the
international competitiveness of Canadian firms.
Thus, the author omits any further consideration
of the potential distributive and humanitarian
goals of patent aggregation arrangements.

Conclusion
The Canadian government’s proposed patent
collective aspires to facilitate the development
and sharing of IP by Canadian firms, especially
SMEs, and to provide defensive measures against
unwarranted patent litigation. While these
ambitious goals are admirable, it is not clear
that a patent collective mechanism, particularly
one that is funded at the proposed level, can
be effective at achieving all of these goals. The
development of more and better IP by Canadian
firms is unlikely to be advanced by the collection
of third-party patents, except, perhaps, in a few
selected industries (for example, petrochemicals)
that could benefit more directly from tax incentive
or subsidy programs and which are already
active in global product and technology markets.
Likewise, the acquisition of Canadian patents
by a collective is unlikely to foster increased
39 See Moyse, supra note 3 (“Given the litigious and economically taxing
environment created by patent trolls or PAEs in the United States, it
is not unforeseeable that the U.S. government would view such funds
unfavourably” at 11).

R&D activity within Canada, as Canadian firms
already benefit from a generous judicially created
“research exemption” from patent infringement,
and Canadian universities, without a far more
directive governmental R&D initiative and
concomitant funding, cannot realistically be
viewed as sources for a large quantity of new
commercially valuable technology across the
board. Likewise, from a defensive standpoint,
it is unlikely that the Canadian government’s
aggregation of patents on behalf of Canadian firms
could achieve even a fraction of the defensive
benefit offered by existing defensive aggregation
programs such as RPX and AST. And the creation
of a formal defensive patent pledge network
among Canadian firms, while potentially useful,
seems to offer few benefits beyond those already
available from networks such as the DPL and LOT.
Finally, Canada’s aggregation of patents for purely
offensive litigation and monetization purposes is
not recommended, as such an endeavour would
not significantly help Canadian industry, could
strain relations with Canada’s trading partners
and, given current market trends, is far from
likely to achieve appreciable financial success.
Accordingly, it is the recommendation of this paper
that the proposed Canadian patent collective avoid
the acquisition and aggregation of patents and
instead focus its limited resources on the following
three supportive functions for Canadian industry:
assist Canadian firms, through subsidies or other
resource commitments, to participate in existing
international defensive patent networks; encourage
Canadian universities and research institutions
to focus on commercially relevant “translational”
research, and possibly to shift Canadian research
funding priorities in this direction; and assess the
potential benefits of facilitating patent sharing or
pooling arrangements in select Canadian industries,
and offering administrative and infrastructural
support for such efforts. It is believed that these
activities, in support of Canadian innovation and
industry, would be better suited to the modest
level of funding currently anticipated for the
Canadian patent collective and would avoid many
of the pitfalls of acquiring and accumulating
patents directly. As such, the Canadian patent
collective could focus on adding value where
it is truly needed to achieve collective benefits
for Canadian industry and technology.
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